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On the many ways Europeanization matters:  






In about the last decade, the scholarly literature on the relationship between regulatory 
reform at the domestic level and regulatory policy at the EU level has increasingly centred 
around the topic of Europeanization (Risse et al., 2001; Börzel, 2002; Olsen, 2002). As 
highlighted by Levi-Faur (2006), “rules and procedures [...] stand as the core of what is 
constructed, diffused and institutionalized as the essence of Europeanization. It is therefore 
reasonable to suggest that regulation and Europeanization advance hand in hand to create an 
innovative and in some respects unprecedented multilevel system of regulatory governance. 
[...] there is no doubt that the intersection of regulation and Europeanization creates one of the 
most intriguing political spaces of our era”. In order to understand the relationship between 
regulation and Europeanization, however, it is necessary to clarify the subject and the aims of 
Europeanization studies first.  
 
The focus of Europeanization studies gradually shifted over time. Early work in this 
field conceived mechanisms and outcomes at the European level as explanatory factors of 
domestic change (Gualini, 2004; Radaelli, 2004). Later ('second generation') Europeanization 
studies, instead, adopted an 'evolutionary' perspective of domestic institutional change, which 
originated from a “specific combinations of factors of change involved in triggering specific 
mechanisms of change, within a broader definition of possible modes of change and of their 
dynamic co-evolutive relationship” (Gualini, 2004: 15). Current Europeanization studies do 
not look at Europeanization as a mere 'top-down' influence from the level of formal EU 
institutions to domestic policies and organizational and individual behaviour. Rather, they 
conceive Europeanization as a changing context of choice and behaviour, which induces shifts 
in the presumptions of actors about the problem-solving arenas and in their strategies 
(Caporaso and Stone Sweet, 2001).  
 
In this 'second generation' meaning, Europeanization can be conceived as the result of 3 
the intertwining between the domestic and the EU-level politics and policy, rather than as the 
causal mechanisms that make the domestic policy process dependent on what takes place at 
the EU level. Gualini (2004: 24) clarifies this point by highlighting that “Europeanization 
cannot be assumed right away as an explanans of processes of change. Rather, 
Europeanization is a framework for analysing difference and variation in processes of mutual 
adaptation and change (and of resistance to change) affected by new patterns of transnational-
national relations: it is actually an explanandum, which puts the explanatory burden on the 
factors, mechanisms and dynamics of mutual adaptation and change (as well as of resistance 
to adaptation and change)”. In this perspective, Levi-Faur (2006) observe that the effect of 
Europeanization on the domestic level can be “less direct, less tangible and less critical than 
many assume”. 
 
Following Radaelli (2004), the relationship between regulation and Europeanization can 
be theorized as an interactive process through which actors at the domestic level develop 
complex adaptation patterns to stimuli originating from the EU level. At the domestic level, 
regulatory change does not take place just because of reactions to adaptational pressures from 
the EU (Börzel and Risse, 2003). Rather, at the domestic level actors “can use Europe in 
many discretionary ways. They may discursively create impacts. They may draw of Europe as 
resource without specific pressure from Brussels. They may get entrapped in European 
discourses and socialization processes that cannot be captured by a narrow notion of impact 
(Jacquot and Woll 2003; Thatcher 2004)” (Radaelli, 2004: 4). According to this view, the 
research agenda of Europeanization is currently highly focused on issued related to what 
accounts for the 'horizontal' interaction between domestic actors (i.e., rather than the 'vertical' 
relationship between the EU and the domestic policy domain) and how these actors make use 
of stimuli originating from the EU.  
 
This paper aims to contribute to this line of inquiry through the case study of the 
implementation of the 1994 water reform in Italy in the period between 1994 and 2006. In 
1994, the Italian Parliament passed Act 36/1994, which intended to radically re-regulate the 
provision of water services in the country. The implementation of Act 36/1994 unfolded over 
several years, during which by and large sub-national governments resisted transposing the 
national water legislation and accomplishing implementation tasks, the central government 
tried to steer (often ineffectively) the course of the water reform implementation, and 4 
incumbent water operators eventually were able to outmanoeuvre the reform efforts by 
retaining a dominant position in the reformed water industry. Differently from other 
regulatory reforms of network industries (e.g., the gas and electricity ones), the water reform 
was neither triggered nor directly affected by any EU-level policy directive. EU water policies 
typically address issues of environmental protection, drinkable water, sewage and wastewater 
treatment standards, and water management, rather than the economic  regulation of the 
provision of water services. Because of this, the case of the implementation of the 1994 water 
reform in Italy is exemplar of a type of domestic policy cycle (more specifically, of the 
implementation 'stage') which is not directly affected by EU-level policies, but in which EU-
level factors may come to play an important role in the 'horizontal' interaction between 
implementers engaged in the domestic policy arena.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised into five parts. Section 2 will describe the research 
design of this study. Section 3 will provide a short narrative of the episode of the 
implementation of the water reform in Italy in the period between 1994 and 2006. Section 4 
will analyse the water reform implementation episode. Section 5 will discuss the findings, and 
the last section will draw the conclusions. 
 
 
2. The research design.  
 
The analysis of the 'horizontal' interaction between implementers engaged in a domestic 
policy arena is conducted following a processual approach. The questions formulated when 
conducting processual research typically seek to explain both the pattern of a process stream 
and the outcome of the process under investigation (Pettigrew, 1997: 340). Accordingly, the 
research questions addressed in this paper are: How was the water reform
 implemented? How 
were sub-national governments able to resist the implementation of the water reform? How, 
instead, was such resistance overcome? How did local governments manage to retain 
influence on the regulated water industry? Why was not the central government fully able to 
steer the course of the water reform implementation? Answering these questions is important 
in order to understand whether and how Europe-level factors are brought to bear into the 
process dynamics of implementing a regulatory reform at the domestic level. 
 5 
In order to tackle these research questions, this paper will extensively draw from 
processual intellectual resources. A large stock of such resources has been accumulated over 
time in various scholarly works, including Barzelay and Campbell (2003), Kingdon (1994), 
and McAdam et al. (2001). Such resources include, in particular, social mechanisms and their 
concatenations (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Gambetta, 1998), as influenced by process 
design features and institutional context factors. The analysis, moreover, will build on the 
assumption that decisions are made following the logic of appropriateness (March, 1994; 
March and Olsen, 1989), for which action depends on actors' understanding of the self (i.e., 
identities) and of the situation, and on the canons of proper behaviour that should be followed 
in any particular circumstances.  
 
The application of a processual framework requires the definition of outcomes that 
provide a focal point to which to 'anchor' the whole investigation (Pettigrew, 1997: 342). The 
outcomes of the episode of implementing the water reform in Italy have been identified in 
various changes of the water regulatory regime, which include a change in the regulatory 
institutions at the sub-national level, the establishment of new regulatory organizations, and 
the enforcement of new regulatory tools. The implementation of the water reform in Italy 
resulted, in particular, in the transposition of the national water legislation into 19 regions, in 
the establishment of the semi-independent central regulatory agency Supervising Committee 
on the Use of Water Resources (Comitato di Vigilanza sull'Uso delle Risorse Idriche) and of 
92 local regulatory agencies (Autorità d'Ambito Territoriale Ottimale or Authorities of the 
Optimal Territorial Areas, henceforth OTA authorities), and in the award of water concessions 
to 102 water firms in 67 OTAs which, by 2006, fully enforced the new regulatory system.  
  
A few additional remarks should be made concerning some specific features of the 
water policy domain, in particular in the context of the EU. One feature of the water policy 
domain is that, among the infrastructure industries, the water one is the most difficult to open 
to competitive forces (Kessides, 2004; Gómez Ibáňez, 2003; Cowan, 1997) because of 
technical constraints on joint water carriage, high sunk costs, and widespread political 
sensitivity against the 'commodification' of water (i.e., charging water tariffs in such a way as 
to fully cover the cost of water service provision plus provide a return to investors). In this 
respect, the establishment of more market-oriented forms of regulation of water service 
provision (e.g., franchise allocation and discretionary regulation) may have a limited 6 
influence on the reconfiguration of the public intervention in the water sector as well as on the 
conduct and performance of water service delivery firms.  
 
Another feature of the water policy domain in the EU is that, with respect to other 
infrastructure industries, the water one lacks any formal EU-level policy concerning any 
liberalization or economic regulation of the sector. Water policies at the EU level, as 
expressed, for instance, in the 2000 Water Framework Directive, generally focus on the 
protection, preservation and management of water resources while they are relatively silent 
about how water infrastructure and service provision should be regulated (i.e., in terms of 
access, tariffs, and investments). Differently from other infrastructure industries (e.g., 
electricity and gas), the water sector has not been subject to any specific EU directive 
concerning the liberalization of service provision. At the EU member state level, then, EU 
water policy typically triggers domestic policy discourses about water centred around the 
themes of environmental protection of water resources, water drinking, sewage, and 
wastewater standards, and water management, rather than reconfiguring water firms' 
ownership structure and modes of regulation. 
 
Taking into account these features of the water policy domain in the EU, explaining the 
outcomes of the water reform implementation in Italy is particularly interesting. Given the 
country's tradition of public ownership of infrastructure, coupled with technical, economic, 
and political difficulties to open up the water sector to competitive forces and the lack of EU-
driven 'push' to liberalise water service provision, we might expect that hardly could more 
market-oriented forms of regulation of water service provision (e.g., franchise allocation and 
discretionary regulation) be established in the country. Yet, by and large the implementation 
of the water reform resulted in the set up of a new regulatory regime in which water firms 
were awarded water concessions and infrastructure development should be mostly funded by 
tariffs set in accordance to criteria of full cost recovery and remuneration of capital invested. 
Explaining how the implementation of the water reform unfolded and, in particular, what role 
did EU-level factors play in the episode is the analytic focus of this work. 
 
Data on the episode of the implementation of the water reform in Italy have been 
collected through interviews to informants based in regulatory agencies, central government 
water firms, and journalists, parliamentary minutes on the making of the water reform, 11 7 
reports to the Parliaments and other water sector reviews issued by the Supervising 
Committee on the Use of Water resources between 1996 and 2007, various reports issued by 
the research centres Proacqua, Astrid, and Utilitatis, proceedings of the yearly conferences 
'H2Obiettivo 2000' organised by the water firms' association Federgasacqua (later renamed 
Federutility from 2005), and articles from the business press Il Sole 24 Ore.  
 
 
3. The implementation of the water reform in Italy (1994-2006). 
 
The 1994 water reform mainly originated from the need to cope, on the one hand, with 
increasing demand for improving water service delivery and water quality (partially due to the 
rising standards set by EU environmental and water directives) and, on the other one, with 
declining public funds available for upgrading the water infrastructure. The reform contained 
in Act 36/1994 aimed to tackle these issues by following a few key design features (Citroni et 
al., 2007). First, in order to reduce the fragmentation of the industry and allow water firms to 
achieve economies of scale, water services should be comprehensively organised and 
managed in relatively large territories (the so-called Ambiti Territoriali Ottimali or OTA). 
Second, in order to better coordinate the stages of the water management cycle, all the 
segments of water services (that is, water catchment, distribution, sewage, and wastewater 
treatment) should be managed 'under one roof' by one only water firm. Third, in order to 
improve the entrepreneurial management of water firms, planning and control functions 
should be separated by those of operational management and service delivery (the former 
being assigned to local regulatory authorities and the latter to the water firms). Finally, in 
order to allow water firms to achieve financial self-sufficiency, water tariffs should cover the 
full cost of the water services (i.e., including investment depreciation and return to capital 
invested).  
 
After the water reform came into force, sub-national governments were expected to 
collaborate in the transposition of the national water legislation to the regional level. Local 
governments, instead, often withdrew participating to the process, because they claimed that 
the central government should fill some details concerning the new regulatory system before 
they could anticipate the consequences of alternative organizational arrangements. In 1996, 
the Minister of Public Works, Antonio Di Pietro, became concerned that the delay to 8 
implement the water reform threatened the spending of the 1994-1999 EU Community 
Support Framework (CSF) funds for infrastructure development. Di Pietro quickly issued the 
regulation of the new tariff system and summoned the regions to transpose the national water 
legislation, otherwise he would exercise central government's substitutive powers. Despite the 
threat, however, the regions progressed slowly in the implementation of the water reform. 
Both the regions and local governments, however, later speeded up the transposition efforts 
from 1997 onwards in reaction to two events. In October 1997, the Parliament assigned 
special funds for an urgent sewage and wastewater treatment investment programme (Act 
344/1997, which was intended to comply with 91/271/CE directive) which also ruled that, in 
those regions which had not transposed the water reform yet, the OTAs equalled the territories 
of the provinces. In 1998, the central government ruled that the transposition of the water 
reform was set as a requirement for accessing additional funds of the 2000-2006 CSF for 
water infrastructure development in the south. Both southern regions, which could benefit 
from the 2000-2006 CSF, and the central and northern ones speeded up the transposition of 
the reform first, which was fully achieved by 1999. 
 
After the regions transposed the water reform, local governments were required to 
establish local regulatory agencies for each OTA (OTA authorities) where to centralise their 
water planning and control functions. Most of local governments accomplished this task 
relatively slowly, as they were concerned with preserving the incumbent position of their 
water firms rather than making the OTA authorities progress towards awarding the water 
concessions. The award of water concession speeded up only in late 2001, when the 
Parliament passed Act 448/2001 (Budget Law), which contained, in article 35, a reform of 
local public services. The reform provided the general rule that local public services of 
industrial relevance (i.e., infrastructure services) should be contracted out through tender offer 
competitions. Special provisions, however, applied to the water sector, whose firms could 
enjoy either an exemption regime (which allowed to extend extant concessions for a period 
from 3 up to 9 years, provided that certain conditions, like floating the shares of the water 
firm in the stock exchange, were met) or a transitory regime (which allowed to directly assign 
the concessions, within 18 months from the passing of the reform, to water firms fully owned 
by all the local governments included in the OTAs – i.e., by 30
th June 2003). 
 
A few years later, in September 2003, the government issued another reform of the local 9 
public services (Legislative Decree No. 269), which originated from the need to prevent an 
infraction procedure from the EU Commission concerning some provisions of the 2001 
reform which contrasted the EU directives on public sector contracts. The 2003 reform 
restated the general rule that local public services should be assigned through tender offer 
competitions, but it also specified that local public service concessions could also be directly 
assigned to mixed public-private ownership companies in which the private partner was 
chosen through tender offer competitions, or to firms which were fully owned by the public 
authorities serviced by the same firms, and which were tightly controlled by the public 
authorities as close as their own divisions (so-called 'in house' water firms, which a 
pronouncement of the European Court of Justice had ruled as a legitimate way of assigning 
local public services in the so-called 'Teckal case' in 1999). After the 2003 reform, several 
OTA authorities started assigning water concessions in accordance to the new rules, in 
particular to 'in house' water firms, which rapidly become the most popular organizational 
form for providing water services in the country. As the direct award of concessions to 'in 
house' firms prevented opening up the water industry to competition, in December 2004 the 
Minister of the Environment, Altero Matteoli, issued a couple of directives which aimed to 
limit the award of water concessions to 'in house' water firms and to mixed public-private 
ownership firms. Most of the OTA authorities, however, disregarded Matteoli's directives and 
kept awarding the water concessions to mixed ownership or 'in house' firms.  
 
 
4. Analysing the water reform implementation process. 
 
In order to examine the resistance of sub-national governments to implement the water 
reform, we can first discuss what kind of behaviour could be expected by sub-national 
governments which are required to cooperate across government layers in order to implement 
a policy mandate. The requirement to transpose the national water legislation to the regional 
level can be characterised as a 'cooperative intergovernmental policy mandate' (May, 1995), 
because it prescribed the result to obtain while it was largely silent about the means by which 
sub-national governments were expected to achieve it. As May (1995) argued, sub-national 
governments which implement a cooperative intergovernmental policy are exposed to various 
pressures 'from above' (i.e., from the national government which expects the delivery of 
policy results) and 'from below' (i.e., from local constituencies and target groups which 10 
require consideration for specific issues). As an effect of these pressures, the implementation 
of a cooperative intergovernmental policy depends on the presence of at least a modicum of 
commitment from the side of the implementers, apart from other factors such as technical and 
financial capacity and inducements for compliance (May, 1995).  
 
Could the regions and local governments be expected to possess a modicum of 
commitment to transpose the national water legislation to the regional level? One way to 
answer this question is to take into account the identity of sub-national governments, the ways 
in which they perceived (or construed) their situation and interpreted their role. Local 
governments had been traditionally involved in the direct management of water services, a 
function which they played in accordance to their autonomy provided by the constitution. 
When the regions called them to collaborate in the transposition of the national water 
legislation, local governments could understand that transposing the water reform would pave 
the way for eventually transferring the water planning and control functions from them to the 
OTA authorities. Little pressure to collaborate in the transposition of the national water 
legislation originated form the public, which generally regards water policy as a low-salience 
policy domain – apart from exceptional periods following distressful events (e.g., flooding). 
Provided this interpretation of local governments' identity features and perception of the 
situation, we can argue that local governments could consider as appropriate for their role to 
protect their stakes in the water sector rather than collaborating in implementing a regulatory 
policy which threatened their institutional prerogatives. The regions, therefore, lacked any 
collaboration from the side of local governments and could not progress in the transposition 
of the national water legislation.  
 
The efforts to transpose the water reform intensified from 1997 onwards, however. Both 
the authoritative definition of the OTAs provided by Act 344/1997 and the design of an 
incentive mechanisms which linked the assignment of 2000-2006 CSF funds for infrastructure 
development to the implementation of the water reform played an important role. First, we 
can consider that local governments could perceive the authoritative definition of the OTAs 
equalling the provinces as a violation of their autonomy to determine the ways of managing 
the local water services. As local governments' autonomy was a politically sensitive topic, 
local governments could find appropriate to consider the transposition of the water reform 
(which included the definition of the OTA territories) as an issue to include in their political 11 
agendas. Second, the southern regions of the country could likely understand, according to 
canons of instrumental rationality (Gambetta, 1998), that they would benefit from additional 
funds for infrastructure development provided by the 2000-2006 CSF if they accelerated the 
transposition of the national water legislation. As the southern regions progressed in 
performing this activity, we can also hypothesize a mechanism of network diffusion 
(Hedström and Swedberg, 1998) to explain why additional regions (i.e., those located in the 
centre and the north of the country) formed the belief in the necessity or inevitability to 
transpose the national water legislation too.  
 
After the regions transposed the national water legislation to the regional level, 
generally local governments proceeded relatively slowly in establishing the OTA authorities 
and making them award water concessions. Taking into account local governments' stakes in 
the local water services, we can consider for them appropriate to resist devolving their 
planning and control functions and reorganising the local water industries in such a way as to 
lose their influence on the water firms. We can highlight, moreover, that the OTA authorities 
did not play any strong volitional role in the establishment of the new regulatory system. In 
order to explain the OTA authorities' limited influence on the implementation process, we can 
hypothesise that the efforts which led local governments to establish the OTA authorities were 
weakly concatenated with the mechanism of actor certification (McAdam et al., 2001). The 
OTA authorities were not really validated as authoritative actors of the local water regulatory 
domain and they experienced difficulties in commanding the resources needed to accomplish 
the assigned tasks (e.g., southern OTA authorities lacked the resources needed to map the 
installed infrastructure base, an activity which was largely performed by the state-owned 
agency Sogesid on their behalf). Furthermore, we can also hypothesise that, after creating the 
OTA authorities, local governments promptly appropriated them (McAdam et al., 2001), with 
the effect that the OTA authorities were exploited as vehicles to implement local governments' 
struggle to resist surrendering their control on water management functions. The OTA 
authorities, in fact, had not been designed as independent local regulatory agencies, and local 
governments maintained an influence on the decisions of the public officers which they 
appointed in charge of the OTA authorities. As a result of these two combined mechanisms, 
the OTA authorities were rather ineffective to fulfil their institutional identity and remained 
confined to merely execute local governments' decisions.  
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The considerations above contribute explaining why the OTA authorities did not award 
water concessions. In order to explain why, instead, from 2001 onwards the OTA authorities 
increased the number of water concessions awards, we need to take into account how the 
making of two local public services reforms in 2001 and 2003 affected the implementation 
process. This question can receive at least three answers. First, if we take into account that the 
2001 local public services reform narrowed the range of option choices for awarding the 
water concessions, then we can hypothesise that a mechanism of attribution of threats 
(McAdam et al., 2001) made some local governments speed up the awarding of water 
concessions before the coming into force of the 2001 reform foreclosed the possibility to 
assign long-term franchise contracts without calling tender offer competitions. This 
mechanism would affect, in particular, the efforts of local governments which had committed 
themselves to reorganise their water services according to an arrangement which would be 
illegitimate under the new local public services legislation, and which had the possibility, 
anyway, to finalise it within a few weeks (i.e., in the short period of time between the passing 
and the coming into force of Act 448/2001 some OTA authorities, in particular in Tuscany, 
'rushed' to carry out the water concession award procedure in December 2001).  
 
Second, if we take into account that the 2001 local public services reform provided that 
the award of water concessions through tender offer competitions could be postponed up to 9 
years if certain conditions were met, then we can hypothesise that a mechanism of attribution 
of opportunities (McAdam et al., 2001) induced some local governments to progress in the 
award of the water concessions according to the requirements of the transitory regime. This 
mechanism would affect, in particular, the efforts of local governments which aimed to retain 
some influence on the management of local water services by making the OTA authorities 
award the water concessions to local government-owned water firms rather than to firms 
selected through tender offer competitions. The possibility offered by the transitory regime, 
however, could be perceived as an opportunity only by local governments which accepted the 
requirements set by the 2001 local public services reforms for postponing the application of 
the tender offer competition rule, i.e., to open up the ownership of the water firms to private 
investors (up to 51%) and to make the water firms increase in size through the merger with 
other operators. In the instances of reorganization of the local water services which matched 
these specific circumstances, as those taking place for example in Emilia Romagna, the 
deadline for the eligibility for the transitory regime set on 30
th June 2003 served as a focusing 13 
event (Kingdon, 1984) which catalysed local governments' efforts to make the OTA 
authorities award the water concessions in relatively short time. 
 
Third, if we take into account that the 2003 local public services reform granted the 
possibility to legitimately award water concessions to mixed public-private ownership and 'in 
house' water firms rather than to firms selected through tender offer competitions, we can 
again hypothesise that a mechanism of attribution of opportunity (Mc Adam et al., 2001) 
triggered several local governments to intensify their efforts to make the OTA authorities 
award the water concessions in ways that allowed them to retain influence on the management 
of local water services. This mechanism would affect, in particular, the efforts of local 
governments which aimed to retain some influence on the management of local water services 
and which had not progressed in the award of water concessions according to the options 
available after the 2001 local public services reform. In several instances of reorganization of 
the local water services all over the country, many local governments exploited the possibility 
to make the OTA authorities award water concessions to 'in house' water firms. 
 
The analysis above suggests that the making of the 2001 and 2003 local public services 
reforms played an important role in the dynamics of allocating water franchises. This role can 
be understood taking into account how local governments made sense of the legislative 
changes and how the sequencing of the local public services reforms reshaped the terms of the 
situation for those local governments which had not made the OTA authorities award the 
water concessions yet. Given these cognitive and situational factors, the mechanism of 
attribution of opportunities and threats (McAdam et al., 2001), which also coupled with the 
presence of focusing events (Kingdon, 1984) centred on deadlines for the application of rules, 
can account for the increase of local governments' efforts in making the OTA authorities 
award the water concessions. The timing and the content of the 2001 and 2003 local public 
services reforms, then, can contribute explaining the particular forms of reorganization of the 
local water services which culminated in the award of water concessions in the few weeks 
between the passing and the coming into force of the 2001 local public services reform, in the 
period from the coming into effect of the 2001 local public services reform until 30
th June 
2003, and after the issue of the 2003 local public services reform. 
 
After the coming into force of the local public services reforms, most of the OTA 14 
authorities awarded the water concessions to local government fully or majority-owned firms 
despite the efforts of the Minister of the Environment Altero Matteoli to make them apply the 
tender offer competition rules. A question arises, then, concerning why Matteoli's efforts were 
not effective to make the OTA authorities award the water concessions to business companies 
selected through competition mechanism. One tentative answer to this question is that 
Matteoli was not able to persuade local governments to accept his policy orientation, which he 
expressed in two directives issued in December 2004, because the 2003 local public services 
reform allowed to legitimately award water concessions to mixed public-private ownership 
and 'in house' firms. Local governments could convincingly bring into play the 1999 ruling of 
the European Court of Justice (i.e., so-called 'Teckal case') which granted legitimacy to the 
direct award of local public service concessions to 'in house' firms. In the process of making 
sense (Weick, 2001; Barzelay and Jacobsen, 2009) of the applicability of formal rules to the 
award of water concessions, then, local governments' convictions about the legitimacy of 
awarding water concessions bypassing the tender offer competition rule were firmly rooted in 
the cues explicitly contained in the European Court of Justice's ruling and in the 2003 
legislation.  
 
Matteoli's efforts to affect the awards of water concessions were also undermined by the 
opposition of the regions. In January 2004, in particular, the region Tuscany appealed to the 
Constitutional Court against the part of the 2003 local public services reform which provided 
a detailed regulation of how local public services should be awarded to companies selected 
through tender offer competitions. In July 2004, the Constitutional Court broadly accepted the 
appeal on the ground that the 2001 constitutional reform did not explicitly assign to the State 
the competences on local public services, which were, therefore, devolved to the regions. We 
can hypothesise, then, that a mechanism of actor de-certification (i.e., “the withdrawal of 
[such] validation [of actors, their performances, and their claims] by certifying agents”, 
McAdam et al., 2001: 121) dispossessed the Minister of the Environment of competences on 
regulating water concession awards at the sub-national level. Matteoli's ineffectiveness to 
affect OTA authorities' decisions, therefore, can be also explained by the role played by the 






Before embarking in the discussion of the process dynamics of implementing the water 
reform in Italy, we can summarise the main findings which originate from the analysis above. 
A first finding, which relates to the resistance to transpose the national water legislation, is 
that the mechanism of the logic of appropriateness initially made sub-national governments, 
which were traditionally involved in the provision of local public services and which could 
understand that the implementation of the water reform would lead to centralise water 
functions away from them, withdraw from collaborating in implementing the water reform. A 
second finding, which relates to the acceleration of the transposition of the national water 
legislation, is that sub-national governments increased their efforts to implement the reform 
because of the effect of hypothesised mechanisms of instrumental rationality (which related to 
the central government's authoritative definition of the OTAs which contrasted with local 
governments' autonomy, and to the incentive for sub-national governments located in the 
southern regions of the country to appropriate additional funds provided by the 2000-2006 
CSF) and network diffusion (which propagated collaborative behaviour across the country). 
Finally, a third finding, which relates to the award of water concessions, is that the 
acceleration in the enforcement of the new regulatory tools can be explained by the 
mechanisms of attribution of opportunities and threats (triggered by the 2001 and 2003 local 
public services reforms) in conjunction with focusing events. The outcome of the process, 
moreover, is affected by the inability of central government officers to steer the behaviour of 
implementers because of the lack of persuasion in the process of sense-making relating to the 
applicability of public contracting rules (related to the European Court of Justice's 
pronouncement), and because of a mechanism of actor de-certification which delegitimised 
the central government to regulate the award of water concessions (related to the 2001 
constitutional reform). 
 
The study of the case of the implementation of the water reform in Italy has provided 
significant elements for drawing some tentative theorizations about the dynamics of 
regulatory reform implementation and the role played by EU-level factors. In the Italian case, 
various features of initial conditions and context factors hampered the implementation of the 
water reform by making sub-national governments resist surrendering their influence on local 
water service provision, but later on obstacles to implement the water reform were eventually 16 
overcome. The case of the implementation of the water reform in Italy, therefore, includes 
types of courses of events in which sub-national governments initially resisted to accomplish 
implementation tasks but later complied with the reform mandate, although in such a way as 
to retain a significant influence on the reformed water sector despite the efforts of central 
government officers to steer the allocation of water franchises. In these changes of trajectory, 
an important role was played by (1) the way in which monetary incentives provided by EU 
funding sources were employed to stimulate progressing in the water reform implementation, 
(2) the way in which changes in the institutional context partially originating from EU factors 
were exploited for preserving the position of incumbent firms in the water sector, and (3) the 
way in which court rulings at the EU level were brought to bear in order to shield the conduct 
of sub-national governments from the pressure of central government officers. Theorizations 
about why and how these changes in trajectory may take place are discussed. 
 
A first tentative statement is that the joint presence of monetary resources which are 
made available by EU programmes and of the authority to make use of these resources for 
stimulating the accomplishment of implementation tasks triggers implementers' pursuit of 
material interests which can lead to collaborating in cascading the regulatory reform at the 
sub-national level and in establishing new regulatory institutions. In the case of the 
implementation of the water reform in Italy, monetary resources were made available by the 
implementation of directive 91/271/CE (Act 344/1997) and of the 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 
CSF. The Parliament allocated monetary resources for implementing directive 91/271/CE to 
authoritatively defined OTAs, and the central government designed an incentive scheme 
which assigned additional funds for infrastructure development provided that sub-national 
governments progressed in accomplishing implementation tasks. Sub-national governments 
reacted to these stimuli by increasing their collaborative efforts in transposing the national 
water legislation to the regional level and in establishing the OTA authorities. The mechanism 
of instrumental rationality, in concatenation with those of focusing event and network 
diffusion, is important for explaining how, after an initial period of resistance, sub-national 
governments later turned to progressing in the implementation of the water reform. 
 
This tentative statement, however, needs some qualifications. The availability of 
monetary resources and the authoritative use of these resources for stimulating the efforts of 
the implementers may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for progressing in the 17 
regulatory reform implementation. Another important ingredient seems to be the activation of 
a mechanism of attribution of threats for mobilising the implementers against the prospect of 
a loss. It is important, in this respect, the perception of the actual loss or of the likelihood that 
the threat would materialise in the future if certain conditions are met. In the case of the 
implementation of the water reform in Italy, for example, the threat conveyed by central 
government officers that the regions would be commissioned if they defaulted transposing the 
national water legislation triggered, on the whole, a modest reaction from the side of sub-
national governments. The authoritative definition of the OTA jurisdictions as equalling the 
provinces, instead, appeared to local governments as an actual loss of their autonomy and 
therefore was likely to make them more inclined to act to remedy against the situation.  
 
Another qualification to the above statement is that progression in regulatory reform 
implementation may be achieved anyway even without any use of monetary incentives. In the 
case of the implementation of the water reform in Italy, for example, sub-national 
governments located in Tuscany carried out the transposition of the national water legislation 
and the establishment of the OTA authorities before the central government made any use of 
monetary resources for stimulating the accomplishment of implementation tasks. In Tuscany, 
as well as in other regions, the presence of monetary resources provided by the 
implementation of directive 91/271/CE and of the 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 CSF did not 
significantly affect the local trajectory of regulatory reform implementation. It is important, in 
this respect, to specify that the use of monetary incentives may help to overcome resistance to 
implement the reform, but also that the presence of monetary incentives is not a necessary 
feature of successful regulatory reform implementation. 
 
A second statement is that changes in the institutional context partially originating from 
EU factors, in conjunction with a tradition of direct involvement of sub-national governments 
in the provision of infrastructure services, triggers the exploitation of opportunities and 
avoidance of threats which lead sub-national governments to find their way to preserve the 
position of incumbent sub-national government-owned firms in the infrastructure industry. In 
the case of the implementation of the water reform in Italy, the 2001 and 2003 local public 
services reforms provided the possibility for the OTA authorities to award water concessions 
to local government fully or partially owned water firms. From 2001 onwards, the OTA 
authorities awarded an increasing number of water concessions over time, mostly to various 18 
kind of local government fully or partially owned firms. The mechanism of attribution of 
opportunity (to make the water concession legitimately awarded to incumbents) and threats 
(that the 'window of opportunity' offered by the rules provided by the local public services 
reforms might close in the future), in concatenation with focusing event (which centred 
around the deadline for the coming into force of the 2001 reform and for the expiration of the 
transitory and exemption regimes), are important for explaining how sub-national 
governments progressed in the implementation of the water reform while being also able to 
preserve the position of the incumbent firms in the water industry. 
 
It should be highlighted, however, that the way in which changes in the institutional 
context are exploited is dependent on the time in which these changes take place with respect 
to the trajectory of regulatory reform implementation at the local level. In the case of the 
implementation of the water reform in Italy, for example, local governments made the OTA 
authorities award the water concessions to different kinds of firms (e.g., mixed public-private 
ownership firms, local government-owned firms whose shares where traded in the stock 
exchange, and 'in house' firms) depending on the rules for the allocation of water franchise 
which were in force at the time. The changes in the institutional context, therefore, are a 
necessary albeit not sufficient condition for making implementers protect the position of the 
incumbent firms in the infrastructure industry. Additional conditions must be met, namely the 
timely restructuring of incumbent firms in order to match the requirements for being allocated 
the infrastructure franchise, in order for sub-national governments to retain their traditional 
influence on the local infrastructure services. 
 
Finally, a third statement that can be drawn from the case of the implementation of the 
water reform in Italy regards the importance of court rulings in making central government's 
efforts to steer the regulatory reform implementation ineffective to influence the behaviour of 
implementers. In 2004, the Minister of the Environment Matteoli tried to make sub-national 
governments award water concessions to business companies selected through tender offer 
competitions rather than to 'in house' or mixed ownership firms. Sub-national governments 
effectively counteracted his efforts by appealing to two judicial rulings, namely the European 
Court of Justice's adjudication of legitimacy of local public service awards to 'in house' water 
firms (i.e., 'Teckal case') and the Constitutional Court's pronouncement of exclusive 
competence of the regions on the detailed regulation of local public services after the 2001 19 
constitutional reform. The mechanisms of sense making (i.e., making sense of which 
behaviour was legitimate) and actor de-certification (which withdraws the authority away 
from the central government) are important to explain how sub-national governments 
succeeded to retain their influence on the local water services in their struggle against the 
central government.  
 
Also the above statement should bear some qualifications. First, court rulings need to be 
actively recalled by sub-national governments in order for them to effectively claim that their 
behaviour, which the central government aims to rectify, is legitimate. In the case of the 
implementation of the water reform in Italy, for example, local governments counteracted 
central governments' efforts to make the OTA authorities award water concessions to business 
companies selected through tender offer competitions by claiming that the assignment of 
water franchise to 'in house' firms was legitimate according to the European Court of Justice's 
adjudication (which, incidentally, had been formulated on a quite different matter but water 
franchise allocation, namely the assignment of local public transport concession). Second, 
court rulings may need to be solicited by sub-national governments in order to provide the 
legal protection against central government's claims to regulate their behaviour. In the Italian 
case, for example, the region Tuscany appealed to the Constitutional Court in order to 
counteract central government's interference with the regulation of the awards of local public 
services, which had been reserved as an exclusive competence of the regions by the 2001 
constitutional reform. The active role of implementers in bringing into consideration or 
eliciting court ruling, therefore, seems to be a crucial factor for shielding their behaviour from 





The study of the case of the implementation of the water reform in Italy has provided 
some important elements for explaining how EU-level factors are brought to bear in the 
implementation of regulatory reforms. In broad terms, at least three groups of factors have 
been identified which affect the dynamics of regulatory reform implementation. A first group 
concerns the factors that contribute accelerating the implementation of regulatory reforms, 
such as monetary incentives and the exercise of authority by the central government. A second 20 
group relates to the factors that allow the target population to 'bend' the implementation of the 
regulatory reform in such a way as to retain their incumbent positions in the regulated sector. 
These factors include changes in the institutional context which open up 'windows of 
opportunity' for the target group to substantively 'hollow out' part of the reform package. 
Lastly, a third group of factors regards those which prevent the central government from 
steering the course of the regulatory reform implementation. These factors include court 
rulings which enforce super-national (e.g., EU) regulations and constitutional changes to 
cases related to the regulatory reform implementation.  
 
How can we deepen our understanding of the influence of EU-level factors on the 
dynamics of the policy process at the domestic (i.e., EU member state) level? Several scholars 
have variously conceived this influence within the frame of reference of Europeanization, 
which refers to “processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public 
policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies’’ (Radaelli, 2003). Cowles and Risse (2001) explained 
domestic change mostly in terms of adaptive reaction to pressures to meet European 
requirements. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002; 1999) proposed to explain the domestic impact of 
European policy making with three Europeanization mechanisms, namely institutional 
compliance, changing the domestic opportunity structures, and framing domestic beliefs and 
expectations (later partially reframed as mechanisms of coercion, competition, and 
communication; Knill and Lenschow, 2005). Harcourt (2003) and Radaelli (2003) highlighted 
the difference between vertical and horizontal mechanisms of Europeanization. Schmidt 
(2008) placed attention on how negative integration (i.e., market making) and legal 
uncertainty around European law affect domestic policy making.  
 
The present study further expands 'horizontal' Europeanization research by identifying 
the social mechanisms which underpin the use of EU-level factors in domestic policy arenas 
which are not specifically regulated by EU policies (the economic regulation of the water 
sector providing an instance of such policy arena). The Italian case shows that EU-level 
factors played an important role in the implementation of the water infrastructure regulatory 
reform: EU funds for infrastructure development were employed by the central government in 21 
the design of monetary incentives for stimulating sub-national governments to accomplish 
implementation tasks, EU directives on environmental regulation and water quality standards 
were implemented by the central government by authoritatively establishing new water 
regulatory jurisdictions (i.e., the OTAs), and the rulings of the European Court of Justice were 
exploited by local governments in order to limit central government's interference on the 
allocation of water franchises. These instances suggest that domestic policies can be 
'Europeanized' through the active use of EU-level factors by domestic actors even in the 
absence of any EU policy keyed to the specific domain. Research examining how domestic 
actors bring EU-level factors to bear in the making and implementation of domestic policies, 
then, is likely to provide further important contributions to the advancement of the study of 
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